Volume 46, Issue 2, January 2020, Pages 200–205
Jean-Christ KINANGA MASALA1 and Marcellin LUNANGA MUKUNDA2
1 Département de Philosophie, Université de Kinshasa, RD Congo
2 Département de Philosophie, Université de Kinshasa, RD Congo
Original language: French
Copyright © 2020 ISSR Journals. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The originality of Wittgenstein's philosophy is decisive in his philosophical investigations. From a reinforced criticism of the Russell’s project and his own Tractatus, he redirects the questioning on ordinary language by abandoning the problems related to the foundation of scientific activity. The ambition to base mathematics on logic implies in turn to base logic. However, such transcendental knowledge cannot exist according to Wittgenstein, who maintains that there is no point of view outside language (metalanguage). Wittgenstein lost interest in language as a means of accessing the truth and began to study it in its current uses. That is why we are talking about the philosophy of ordinary language.
Author Keywords: Wittgenstein, language, philosophical investigations, logic.
Jean-Christ KINANGA MASALA1 and Marcellin LUNANGA MUKUNDA2
1 Département de Philosophie, Université de Kinshasa, RD Congo
2 Département de Philosophie, Université de Kinshasa, RD Congo
Original language: French
Copyright © 2020 ISSR Journals. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
The originality of Wittgenstein's philosophy is decisive in his philosophical investigations. From a reinforced criticism of the Russell’s project and his own Tractatus, he redirects the questioning on ordinary language by abandoning the problems related to the foundation of scientific activity. The ambition to base mathematics on logic implies in turn to base logic. However, such transcendental knowledge cannot exist according to Wittgenstein, who maintains that there is no point of view outside language (metalanguage). Wittgenstein lost interest in language as a means of accessing the truth and began to study it in its current uses. That is why we are talking about the philosophy of ordinary language.
Author Keywords: Wittgenstein, language, philosophical investigations, logic.
Abstract: (french)
L’originalité de la philosophie de Wittgenstein est décisive dans ses Investigations philosophiques. A partir d’une critique renforcée du projet russellien et de son propre Tractatus, il réoriente l’interrogation sur le langage ordinaire en abandonnant les problèmes liés à la fondation de l’activité scientifique. L’ambition de fonder les mathématiques sur la logique implique à son tour de fonder la logique. Or un tel savoir transcendantal ne saurait exister selon Wittgenstein qui soutient qu’il n’y a pas de point de vue extérieur au langage (métalangage). Wittgenstein se désintéresse du langage comme moyen d’accès à la vérité et se met à l’étudier dans ses usages courants. C’est pourquoi l’on parle de philosophie du langage ordinaire.
Author Keywords: Wittgenstein, langage, investigations philosophiques, logique.
How to Cite this Article
Jean-Christ KINANGA MASALA and Marcellin LUNANGA MUKUNDA, “WITTGENSTEIN SUR LA VOIE DU LANGAGE COMME USAGE,” International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 200–205, January 2020.
