Volume 38, Issue 1, August 2018, Pages 7–15
Miesso ABALO1
1 Université de Kara, Togo
Original language: French
Copyright © 2018 ISSR Journals. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The problem facing the ego as a subject in the world is existential. Posed from a phenomenological point of view in Fichte, this problem is not only likely to make the self a subject in the sole intension of distinguishing it from the object, from the nonego, from the world, but to show that there is a position originating from the self, from the world and from what has already been posited. Thus, any synthesis obtained from the self goes beyond any gaze of the given, of the being in order to grasp it in the experience of the identity of the subject and the object. The synthesis of this identity highlights the need for philosophy to have the basic principles on which it now rests as a new way of philosophizing after Kant. Thus, the modalities that contribute to this way of philosophizing will make of the ego, especially from Fichte, the backbone in the reflection on the correlation conscience-world. It's about making me a subject in the world, an absolute subject.
Author Keywords: Consciousness, ego, world, nonego, object, presence, subject.
Miesso ABALO1
1 Université de Kara, Togo
Original language: French
Copyright © 2018 ISSR Journals. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract
The problem facing the ego as a subject in the world is existential. Posed from a phenomenological point of view in Fichte, this problem is not only likely to make the self a subject in the sole intension of distinguishing it from the object, from the nonego, from the world, but to show that there is a position originating from the self, from the world and from what has already been posited. Thus, any synthesis obtained from the self goes beyond any gaze of the given, of the being in order to grasp it in the experience of the identity of the subject and the object. The synthesis of this identity highlights the need for philosophy to have the basic principles on which it now rests as a new way of philosophizing after Kant. Thus, the modalities that contribute to this way of philosophizing will make of the ego, especially from Fichte, the backbone in the reflection on the correlation conscience-world. It's about making me a subject in the world, an absolute subject.
Author Keywords: Consciousness, ego, world, nonego, object, presence, subject.
Abstract: (french)
Le problème auquel le moi est confronté en tant sujet au monde est d’ordre existentiel. Posé du point de vue phénoménologique chez Fichte, ce problème n’est pas seulement de nature à faire du moi un sujet dans l’unique intention de le distinguer de l’objet, du non-moi, du monde, mais de montrer qu’il y a une position originaire du moi, du monde et de ce qui a été déjà posé. Ainsi, toute synthèse obtenue à partir du moi va au-delà de tout regard du donné, de l’étant afin de le saisir dans le vécu de l’identité du sujet et de l’objet. La synthèse de cette identité met en évidence le besoin pour la philosophie d’avoir les principes de base sur lesquels elle repose désormais comme une nouvelle manière de philosopher après Kant. Ainsi, les modalités qui concourent à cette façon de philosopher feront du moi, surtout à partir de Fichte, l’épine dorsale dans la réflexion sur la corrélation conscience-monde. Il s’agit de faire du moi un sujet au monde, un sujet absolu.
Author Keywords: conscience, moi, monde, non-moi, objet, présence, sujet.
How to Cite this Article
Miesso ABALO, “Du moi comme une affirmation du sujet : Pour une phénoménologie de la présence chez Fichte,” International Journal of Innovation and Scientific Research, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 7–15, August 2018.
