Billy DIABASENGA KUSUAMINA1 and Sion DIABASENGA LUYINDULA2
1 École de Télédétection Spatiale (ETS), Université Pédagogique Nationale (UPN), Kinshasa, RD Congo
2 Section Aviation Civile, Institut Supérieur de Techniques Appliquées (ISTA, Kinshasa), RD Congo
Original language: English
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Abstract
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) radio frequency interference (RFI) has become a growing operational threat to civil aviation, especially in and around conflict-affected regions. This article develops a publication-ready case study of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), focusing on repeated GNSS jamming and spoofing events reported in the eastern portion of the Kinshasa Flight Information Region (FIR) between May 2024 and January 2025. The study is based on a structured documentary analysis of the DRC national presentation delivered during the ACAO/ICAO Radio Navigation Workshop in Rabat in February 2025, complemented by current ICAO, ITU, EASA, and IATA guidance and policy documents. The findings show that the affected areas - notably Goma, Butembo, Beni, and Lubero - experienced recurrent signal loss from the surface up to at least FL210, affecting multiple aircraft categories, including transport aircraft, regional aircraft, unmanned aircraft, United Nations flights, and military flights. Operational effects included re-routing, visual continuations, temporary suspension of GNSS-based instrument flight procedures and drone operations, elevated operator risk assessments under safety management systems, and rising economic and passenger-service burdens. The article argues that the DRC case is significant because it illustrates the asymmetry between rapidly increasing dependence on satellite-based CNS and the limited enforceability of civil aviation rules when military or extraterritorial interference is involved. It proposes a resilience framework built on five pillars: threat monitoring, risk assessment, contingency navigation, civil-military coordination, and harmonized reporting. The article concludes that States exposed to conflict-proximate interference should preserve a minimum operational network of conventional navigation aids, standardize GNSS RFI NOTAM practices, integrate spectrum regulators into aviation safety governance, and strengthen regional escalation mechanisms through ICAO and ITU.
Author Keywords: GNSS, radio frequency interference, jamming, spoofing, air navigation safety, Kinshasa FIR, Democratic Republic of the Congo, CNS resilience.
